Files
cv-site/internal/middleware/security.go
T
juanatsap 8f4d0e9433 feat: self-host HTMX 2.0.10 and Hyperscript 0.9.91, remove unpkg CDN
- Download htmx.min.js v2.0.10 and _hyperscript.min.js v0.9.91 locally
- Update head-scripts.html to load from /static/ instead of unpkg CDN
- Remove https://unpkg.com from CSP script-src whitelist
- Update all documentation references to reflect self-hosted paths
- No breaking changes: all hx-* attributes are HTMX 2.0 compatible
2026-05-14 12:59:30 +01:00

256 lines
7.3 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
c "github.com/juanatsap/cv-site/internal/constants"
)
// SecurityHeaders adds production-grade security headers to responses
func SecurityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Prevent clickjacking
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderXFrameOptions, c.FrameOptionsSameOrigin)
// Prevent MIME type sniffing
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderXContentTypeOpts, c.NoSniff)
// XSS Protection (legacy but still useful for older browsers)
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderXXSSProtection, c.XSSProtection)
// Referrer policy - strict privacy
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderReferrerPolicy, c.ReferrerPolicy)
// Permissions Policy - disable unnecessary features
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderPermissionsPolicy,
"geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=(), payment=(), usb=(), "+
"magnetometer=(), gyroscope=(), accelerometer=()")
// Content Security Policy (comprehensive)
csp := "default-src 'self'; " +
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://esm.sh https://matomo.txeo.club; " +
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; " +
"font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; " +
"img-src 'self' data: https:; " +
"connect-src 'self' https://api.iconify.design https://matomo.txeo.club; " +
"frame-ancestors 'self'; " +
"base-uri 'self'; " +
"form-action 'self'"
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderCSP, csp)
// HSTS - only in production with HTTPS
if os.Getenv(c.EnvVarGOEnv) == c.EnvProduction {
// 1 year max-age, include subdomains
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderHSTS, c.HSTSMaxAge)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// OriginChecker restricts API access to requests from allowed origins only
// Prevents external sites from hotlinking/accessing resource-intensive endpoints
func OriginChecker(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Get allowed domains from environment (comma-separated)
// Example: ALLOWED_ORIGINS="yourdomain.com,www.yourdomain.com"
allowedOriginsEnv := os.Getenv("ALLOWED_ORIGINS")
// If empty, add "juan.andres.morenorub.io", as it is the domain of the CV
if allowedOriginsEnv == "" {
allowedOriginsEnv = "juan.andres.morenorub.io"
}
// Default to localhost for development
allowedOrigins := []string{"localhost", "127.0.0.1"}
if allowedOriginsEnv != "" {
customOrigins := strings.Split(allowedOriginsEnv, ",")
for _, origin := range customOrigins {
allowedOrigins = append(allowedOrigins, strings.TrimSpace(origin))
}
}
// Check Origin header (for CORS requests)
origin := r.Header.Get(c.HeaderOrigin)
if origin != "" {
if !isAllowedOrigin(origin, allowedOrigins) {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden: External access not allowed", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
// Check Referer header (for direct requests)
referer := r.Header.Get(c.HeaderReferer)
if referer != "" {
if !isAllowedOrigin(referer, allowedOrigins) {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden: External access not allowed", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
// Allow if no Origin/Referer (direct browser access)
// This allows your own site visitors to access the endpoint
if origin == "" && referer == "" {
// For production, you might want to be stricter here
// For now, allow it (users can bookmark /export/pdf directly)
if os.Getenv(c.EnvVarGOEnv) == c.EnvProduction && r.URL.Path == c.RouteExportPDF {
// In production, require at least a referer for PDF endpoint
http.Error(w, "Forbidden: Direct access not allowed", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// isAllowedOrigin checks if the origin/referer matches allowed domains
func isAllowedOrigin(originURL string, allowedOrigins []string) bool {
originURL = strings.TrimSpace(originURL)
originURL = strings.TrimPrefix(originURL, "http://")
originURL = strings.TrimPrefix(originURL, "https://")
// Extract domain from URL (remove path)
parts := strings.Split(originURL, "/")
domain := parts[0]
// Remove port if present
domain = strings.Split(domain, ":")[0]
for _, allowed := range allowedOrigins {
if strings.EqualFold(domain, allowed) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// rateLimitEntry tracks rate limiting per IP
type rateLimitEntry struct {
count int
resetTime time.Time
}
// RateLimiter provides simple in-memory rate limiting
type RateLimiter struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
clients map[string]*rateLimitEntry
limit int // requests allowed
window time.Duration // time window
}
// NewRateLimiter creates a new rate limiter
func NewRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration) *RateLimiter {
rl := &RateLimiter{
clients: make(map[string]*rateLimitEntry),
limit: limit,
window: window,
}
// Cleanup expired entries every minute
go rl.cleanup()
return rl
}
// Middleware returns rate limiting middleware
func (rl *RateLimiter) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Get client IP (handle X-Forwarded-For for proxies)
ip := r.Header.Get(c.HeaderXForwardedFor)
if ip == "" {
ip = r.Header.Get(c.HeaderXRealIP)
}
if ip == "" {
ip = strings.Split(r.RemoteAddr, ":")[0]
}
if !rl.allow(ip) {
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderRetryAfter, "60")
http.Error(w, "Rate limit exceeded. Please try again later.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// allow checks if the request is allowed based on rate limit
func (rl *RateLimiter) allow(ip string) bool {
rl.mu.Lock()
defer rl.mu.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
entry, exists := rl.clients[ip]
if !exists || now.After(entry.resetTime) {
// New client or window expired
rl.clients[ip] = &rateLimitEntry{
count: 1,
resetTime: now.Add(rl.window),
}
return true
}
if entry.count >= rl.limit {
return false
}
entry.count++
return true
}
// cleanup removes expired entries periodically
func (rl *RateLimiter) cleanup() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(c.RateLimitGeneralCleanupPeriod)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
rl.mu.Lock()
now := time.Now()
for ip, entry := range rl.clients {
if now.After(entry.resetTime) {
delete(rl.clients, ip)
}
}
rl.mu.Unlock()
}
}
// CacheControl adds cache headers to static files
// 1 hour in development, 1 day in production
func CacheControl(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cacheValue := c.CachePublic1Hour
if os.Getenv(c.EnvVarGOEnv) == c.EnvProduction {
cacheValue = c.CachePublic1Day
}
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderCacheControl, cacheValue)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// DynamicCacheControl adds appropriate cache headers for dynamic HTML pages
// Short cache with must-revalidate for dynamic content
func DynamicCacheControl(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// For dynamic HTML pages: short cache, must revalidate
// This improves performance while ensuring fresh content
if os.Getenv(c.EnvVarGOEnv) == c.EnvProduction {
// Production: 5 minutes cache, but must revalidate
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderCacheControl, c.CachePublic5Min)
} else {
// Development: no cache for easier testing
w.Header().Set(c.HeaderCacheControl, c.CacheNoStore)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}